Reforms Needed in Negligence Practice by Oleck, Howard L.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1957
Reforms Needed in Negligence Practice
Howard L. Oleck
Cleveland Marshall College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Legal Profession Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Howard L. Oleck, Reforms Needed in Negligence Practice, 6 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 388 (1957)
Reforms Needed in Negligence Practice
Howard L. Oleck*
N EGLIGENCE LAwVyERS now often are classed with criminal
lawyers, in public opinion, as the "black sheep" of the legal
profession. In the minds of many average Americans, there is
something vaguely disreputable about lawyers who specialize in
plaintiffs' personal injury practice. Nor is defense practice
deemed to be without blemish. That public opinion now is so
well established, rightly or wrongly, that it no longer can be
ignored.
This is a most serious matter, considering the fact that about
70% of all cases on court calendars today are tort claims. It is
long past time that the Bench and Bar faced up to this ugly prob-
lem. If the public opinion is correct, a sweeping investigation
and house cleaning must be launched. If it is incorrect, strong
action must be undertaken in order to correct it. One thing is
certain-the problem will soon reach dangerous proportions, for
the legal profession and for the public, if it continues to be
almost ignored.
A single illustration of the present public attitude should
suffice to indicate its gravity. In the January 1957 issue of
Harper's Magazine there appeared a feature article entitled
"Damage Suits: A Primrose Path To Immorality." 1 Everyone
knows that Harper's is an old, honorable, and cultivated publica-
tion, not a "scandal-sheet" by any means. It has a high standing
throughout the nation.
One basic rule of magazine publishing is well known to
every writer. That is this-magazines publish material that they
believe will win public acceptance; they give the people what
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Law School; Member of the New
York, Ohio, and Federal Bars; Author and Editor of books and lawyers'
services on negligence, corporations, and other subjects; etc.
[Editor's Note: Extracts from this paper were presented by the author
at the Belli Seminar concluding the NACCA Convention in New York City
in July 1957. The stenographic record of the delivery of the address, com-
plete with open discussion, will appear, together with the full text, in the
forthcoming 1957 Trial and Tort Trends (Belli, ed.), soon to be published
by Central Book Co., New York.
1 Morton M. Hunt, Damage Suits: A Primrose Path To Immorality, 214
Harper's Magazine (1280) 67-70 (Jan. 1957). See also, Baskin, Case of the
Personal Injury Lawyer, 13 (1957); Grace, Ambulance-Chasers, Beware!, 19
Tex. B. J. 583 (1956); Barnet, Layman's Look at the Bench and Bar, 27
Okla. B. A. J. 377 (1956); Lambert, Principles, Persuasions, and Primrose
Propaganda, 19 NACCA L. J. 25 (1957).
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the people believe or want to believe, almost every time. Most
magazines are not out to mold public opinion and tastes, but
rather to cater to public opinion and tastes. In other words, the
editors of Harper's were fairly sure that the public would readily
agree with the statements made in the article on damage suits.
The Harper's article's sub-title summed up the general prem-
ise of the whole piece, as follows:
"Suing somebody for damages is becoming a new-and pe-
culiarly American-form of Big Business. It also is clogging
up our courts, corrupting the jury system, and undermining
our precious tradition of honesty and fair play."
It hardly is necessary to say more about this item. It went
on in what amounted to a tirade of bitter accusations and con-
demnations against personal injury plaintiffs' lawyers generally,
and obliquely against NACCA. Full of half-truths and startling
non-sequiturs, it spun a hair-raising yarn of general corruption
and evil.
I was so incensed at some unfair and misleading statements
in this masterpiece that I wrote to John Fischer, the editor-in-
chief of Harper's. I offered to write a rebuttal guaranteed to
demolish many statements in the article. Fischer answered that
several readers had criticized the piece, but that a rebuttal would
be futile as it would appear only months later. He asked instead
that I write a "letter to the editor" rebuttal. This, I preferred
not to do. But the implications of the incident should be clear
to every negligence lawyer.
These implications fall into a number of major categories.
Unpleasant as they are, it is necessary to look at them squarely,
and then to do something about them. If the Bar does nothing
about them for much longer, rest assured that others soon will
do something about them-something perhaps not very pleasant
for the lawyers who refuse to properly manage their own pro-
fession.
Principal Criticisms of Tort Practice
In most criticisms of tort practice several particular accusa-
tions appear repeatedly. One is that plaintiffs' negligence prac-
tice is full of the pungent aroma of "ambulance chasing." This
undoubtedly is the chief idea that makes personal injury practice
somehow vaguely disreputable. It is an accusation often made
by laymen, newspapers, some insurance companies and railroads,
some Bar Associations, and some judges.
It is an ugly but inescapable fact that many people believe
389'
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that a big tort practice necessarily implies the use of touts, run-
ners, and ambulance chasing. A corollary belief is that many
minor accidents are puffed up into large claims based on inflated
or even manufactured evidence. Some personal injury lawyers
themselves spread such stories, in gossiping about competing
attorneys. The newspapers, of course, eagerly feature every case
of lawyers' misbehavior that they can find. It is good for circula-
tion.
The worst part of this widespread belief is that it is partly
true. You and I know, from our own personal experience, that
"John Doe" does use touts and runners. Not most lawyers, of
course-only "John Doe." We know that some insurance ad-
justers do have regular percentage arrangements for "handling
a case right." We know that a few lawyers have a real income
tax problem in reporting certain payments for services rendered
in settling some cases. We know that some big defendants do try
to coerce injured employees into not asserting their legal rights.
And so on.
We know these things. But what do we usually do about
them. The answer is: Nothing. We excuse our own inaction by
arguing that we can't prove anything, of course. But isn't the
real reason that we simply prefer not to get involved, most of
the time! I well know that what I am saying here will win me
much criticism and no benefits. But these things need to be said,
bluntly and frankly. [Note: At the Belli Seminar, when some of
these matters were bluntly stated, a furor arose, with a few in
the audience denying any need for reform; but most of the law-
yers present congratulating the writer for airing the problem.]
Without pausing to discuss each of them at this point, we can
readily list the principal general criticisms of tort practice. We
shall discuss them separately, below. The list itself is ominous:
"Ambulance chasing";
"Inflated claims";
"Manufactured evidence";
"Corruption and bribery";
"Monopoly by a few offices";
"Clogging the courts";
"Abuse of the jury system";
"Harassment of medical man";
"Raising insurance rates";
"Exorbitant fees";
"Use of circus methods";
And, the catch-all charge-
"Destroying the ethics of the Bar and of the Nation."
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Let's examine these charges, one by one.
The Charge: "Ambulance Chasing"
So thoroughly has the rumor of "ambulance chasing" become
associated with personal injury practice that in the minds of
many people it is almost a synonym for such practice. In actuality
the vast majority of tort lawyers would as soon commit murder
as "chase" for cases. But you and I know that some few lawyers
are guilty of ambulance chasing. They should be dealt with as
any unethical practitioner is dealt with in any branch of law
practice, of course. Far too many laymen, injured in an accident,
are first bewildered and then filled with contempt when their
phones begin to ring with calls from lawyers brazenly soliciting
the case. I know of people who received actually dozens of such
solicitation calls, after an accident.
Unhappily, some perfectly legitimate efforts to obtain cases
are lumped together with "chasing." I mean, for example, the
cultivating of labor union and association leaders, in the hope
that they will recommend the lawyer to their members when a
case arises. If this cultivation is honest and ethical, it is no more
reprehensible than joining the Union League Club in order to
seek corporation-executive clients.
All in all, the charge is a canard, as far as most tort lawyers
are concerned. If good connections, that produce many clients,
are unethical per se, we can criticize any branch of any pro-
fession on this ground--engineers who cultivate construction com-
pany executives, patent lawyers who cultivate engineers, physi-
cians who cultivate workmen's compensation officials, and so on.
Of course, though, splitting fees with laymen is really sheer
bribery. So, some people say, is advancing money to clients, ex-
cept in extraordinary cases.
Advancing money to clients is generally viewed as highly
questionable-practically equivalent to maintenance. Attempts
to justify this practice have been quite unconvincing, and have
won only token support even among plaintiffs' lawyers.
Apparently some newspapers have spread the rumor of wide-
spread "chasing." And so have some powerful railroad and in-
surance companies. The very recent case of In re Heirich 2 re-
vealed the organized efforts of 21 railroads in an effort to destroy
one lawyer. It revealed, too, the very questionable misleading
of the grievance committee of a major Bar Association, to utilize
2 In re Heirich, 140 N. E. 2d 825 (Ill., 1957).
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its aid in this shabby enterprise. In passing, the Illinois court
also mentioned similar past endeavors by insurance companies.
Nastiness begets nastiness. Take the interesting recent
Cleveland case, where plaintiffs' lawyers and a defending rail-
road both covered themselves with shabby "glory." A leg-
amputation case victim was receiving calls from lawyers all over
the country. The railroad representatives meanwhile succeeded
in selling the victim on settlement without counsel. Then they
wired his living room and encouraged the claimant to accept
further visits from lawyers. Then they recorded the conversa-
tions of the lawyers, in the hope of catching some compromising
statements. I have this story from a Cleveland newspaper re-
porter who is a law student in my classes. An edifying lesson for
a law student-isn't it!
The whole attitude of the public, of many courts, and of
quite a few Bar Associations has been tinged with suspicion. In
a recent California case, for example, it was said that bias against
a lawyer because he is a personal injury specialist is not enough,
in itself, to set aside a disciplinary order.3 There, a State Bar
Association had brought disciplinary proceedings against the
lawyer. The court said that the lawyer would have to prove
biased action against him, in order to obtain relief. The implica-
tion was shockingly clear-that it is somehow normal for Bar
Associations to be generally biased against tort lawyers-that
tort practice is, per se, somehow generally disreputable.
With all friendliness to the NACCA public relations man, I
must say that NACCA has dismally failed in its public relations
work on this score. This is no "one man" problem. It will take
many men, much money, and much time to undo the scandalous
defamation spread by many wealthy and powerful organizations
and persons.
The public relations work of the Bar is almost pathetic when
compared with that of the American Medical Association. Not
long ago I heard that the A. M. A. is listed as among the top
lobbies in Washington, D. C., in terms of money spent. It is cer-
tain that, relatively speaking, the money spent by the Bar on
public relations is ridiculously small. Every profession and trade
association today works hard at improving its public relations.
Lawyers undoubtedly are near the bottom of the list in this
respect.
3 Burns v. State Bar, 288 P. 2d 514 (Calif., 1955).
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Here is a major task that NACCA and every tort lawyer
must face-the task of improving the now-very-bad public rela-
tions of the tort Bar. The "splinter-organization" system of Bar
Associations in itself is a serious handicap. Closer coordination
of NACCA and Insurance Counsel Associations with other Bar
Associations is a prerequisite to better public relations work.
Personal "empire building" must become secondary to the wel-
fare of the entire profession and of the public. All, of course,
much easier to say than to do. But if it isn't even said, it hardly
is likely to be done.
The Charge: "Inflated Claims"
Here, the critics are on solid ground. It is a fact that far too
many complaints filed contain "telephone number" sums, far
too often based on minor injuries. It is common practice to pick
a number out of the air, preferably at least a five-figure number,
for practically every claim.
Too often, claims are estimated more moderately only in
order to file in a local court of limited monetary jurisdiction.
This, usually, in order to obtain quicker trial than is possible in
the calendar-clogged superior trial courts.
If a lawyer wants to properly protect his client, as he should,
against possible future increases in the injury results, he should
do so within reason. It is slovenly, as well as unprofessional, to
exaggerate claims. Enough leeway for settlement-bargaining can
be had without using wildly improbably estimates.
This oft-repeated accusation is seldom rebutted, because it
so often is true. If tort lawyers will not use restraint in this re-
spect, restraints surely will be imposed on them by the courts
and legislatures.
As to this charge, the answer unhappily is: Guilty.
Some courts, notably those of New York, already have im-
posed restraints on exaggeration of claims, with calendar and
pre-trial penalties. There will be more penalties, unless the tort
lawyers impose reasonable restraints on themselves.
Incidentally, pre-trial lends itself also to "beating-down"
tactics by insurance company counsel, partly because of this prac-
tice of inflating of claims. In a recent New York case one in-
surance company's lawyers were castigated by the court for such
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abuse of pre-trial in "beating-down" claims.4 Some other de-
fense lawyers, never so castigated, customarily use pre-trial and
other means for "beating-down" claim amounts. But the root of
the evil is the unbridled tendency to puff up claims-a tendency
obvious in too many plaintiffs' lawyers.
Use of pre-trial promises to become more and more common
and sweeping. The opportunities for exposing inflated claims are
increasing rapidly. It is at least questionable, too, for plaintiffs'
lawyers to invest thousands of dollars in building up a case. 5
Will plaintiffs' lawyers heed the warnings? That remains to
be seen.
The Charge: "Manufactured Evidence"
As in every branch of practice, the possibility of "manufac-
tured evidence" exists in tort practice. As in every branch of law
practice, there are elaborate provisions for preventing and re-
vealing false evidence. That is what the rules of evidence are for,
and cross-examination, and other devices. There is no more
reason to suspect false evidence in tort cases than in any other
kinds of cases.
Apparently the charge of large scale "manufacturing" of
evidence in negligence cases is without real foundation. Such
evidence is more deadly to the one who uses it than to his
opponent, ordinarily.
Part of the genesis of this unjust accusation lies in the com-
plex medicolegal and scientific bases of much evidence in per-
sonal injury cases. Not truly understanding the evidence, hostile
critics simply mutter "fraud" and vaguely hint at dark doings.
The charge of manufacturing of evidence, irritating and
unjust as it is, is best ignored. To persistent critics, the obvious
answer is: "Prove it. That's what courts are for-proof." I.e.,
"Put up or shut up."
4 People v. Sacks, 2 Misc. (N. Y.) 2d 201 (1956). But see, contra, for ex-
ample, McNeal, "Whiplash"-Defense Counsel's View, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 38,
45 (1957); digested in 2 Defense L. J. 413 (1957). And see, Lorry, Settlement
of Personal Injury Claims, 1 Prac. Lawyer, 19 (1955); Weston, Appeasement
of Tort Claimants, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 58 (1957). A Page One headline in the
Cleveland Plain Dealer on June 2, 1957 trumpeted "Insect Bite Brings Suit
For $400,000," in a suit brought by A. H. Dudnik in a leg-amputation case-
typifying how newspapers treat such claims.
5 As to pre-trial, see, Marks, Pre-Trial Motions, 136 N. Y. L. J. (21) 4
(July 31, 1956); Harmon, Summer Pre-Trials, Ibid.; Note, 2 NCS 7 (1956-7).
As to over $5000 spent preparing one plaintiff's case, see, Ashe, Behind the
Scenes of a $250,000 Verdict, 22 Okla. B. A. J. 62 (1951).
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The Charge: "Corruption and Bribery"
Some adjusters and claims agents do have "special arrange-
ments" with some plaintiffs' lawyers for settlement of claims.
These few people, and the few lawyers who cooperate with them
in settling cases on a "payoff" basis, are corrupt. This is bribery.
We all have heard (but few of us actually know) of these men,
and of these "arrangements." There is much smoke around this
charge. How much fire there is in the charge is a pure guess..
In my own twenty years of experience I have never actually
seen such a case of corruption and bribery. I have heard hearsay
about several people-never any concrete evidence. I have also
heard that some insurance company claims men are the main
"hustlers" for their natural enemies-some plaintiffs' lawyers.
They see the client first, and steer him to their collaborator.
If the charge is ever true, one thing seems plain-it damns
the defense as well as the plaintiff's side. It takes two to pay a
bribe. The one who sells his own company and client, moreover,
is far worse than the one who "kicks back" part of a recovery
that he obtains for a client.
Loose gossip, all too often on the part of lawyers, about other
lawyers, is partly responsible for the rumors of bribery. The
threat of libel or slander suits keeps such gossip vague and un-
specific. But the harm it does is very specific indeed. It harms
every lawyer, and especially every tort lawyer.
Until actual names are named and charges filed with the
authorities, the best we can do is hope that the gossip is nothing
more than gossip.
The Charge: "Monopoly By a Few Offices"
True enough, we must admit. The big negligence offices do
have most of the tort practice in every major city. Averbach,
Baker, Belli, Berman, Gair, Halpern, Karlin, Kennett, Mozingo,
Ross, Rucker, Sindell, Dudnik, Spangenberg, and their equiva-
lent-colleagues, do handle a goodly portion of all the major
cases.
But in one metropolitan center which I will not identify more
exactly, three defense firms this year had pending cases totaling
one-third of the entire pending court calendar. The precise case-
total figures for these defense offices were, respectively, 1500,
600, and 350 cases each, or a total of 2450 cases, out of slightly
more than 7000 tort actions pending in this city. In the same city,
their plaintiffs' counterparts, called the "big three" of this city,
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had respectively 575, 460, and 380 cases filed, or a total of 1415
cases. Monopoly, on a numerical basis, is worse among defense
firms than among plaintiffs', here.
Judges in New York, Cleveland, and other cities recently
have complained that there are "not enough lawyers" handling
tort cases. They mean that the few top offices in each city handle
most of the cases. As a man can only be in one place at one time,
it does seem at first scrutiny that such "monopoly" may be
partly responsible for the slowness of our court operation and
the frequency of adjournments of cases.
Responsibility, however, must also be shared by defense
firms. They are just as guilty in failing to provide enough trial
lawyers as are plaintiffs' firms, to handle expeditiously their
large court calendars. Moreover, an insured defendant should
pick his own defense counsel, say some people, and not be forced
to accept the insurer's choice.
First, as to the "wrongfulness" of these "monopolies"-
surely it is not yet a crime, in these United States, to be suc-
cessful and "big." Nobody is urging the breakup of White and
Case or the Cravath firm because they handle much major cor-
poration work. Nobody attacks the big Wall Street "law fac-
tories" because they monopolize most of the big reorganizations
and securities cases. Certainly some defense firms monopolize
some insurance companies' defense tort work, too.
Where a law office has so much work that it cannot handle
the cases efficiently, however, that is another matter. That has
happened in the offices of both plaintiffs' and defense lawyers.
Usually this is because a successful trial lawyer naturally tends
to want to try every important case himself. His mistake in this
very human tendency does cause delay in the courts.
The solution to this problem is simple to say-not so easy
to do. More trial lawyers-good ones-is the solution. But good
trial lawyers do not grow on trees. They must be trained and
seasoned.
Dave Sindell, of Cleveland, is a good example of wise, for-
ward-looking lawyers in his method of solving the problem.
Sindell, Sindell, Bourne and Disbro, one of the top tort practice
offices in the midwest, began to build for the future several years
ago. They founded tort and trial practice prizes at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School. Today they take the top graduates into
their office each year. There they train promising young trial
men, starting them with minor cases and bringing them along to
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bigger and bigger matters. In the past year or so Dave Sindell
has added four or five first-cla3s trial men to his firm's top echelon.
The same thing is done with preparation men, appeal men, and
so on. This is an exhilarating and most useful example of en-
lightened self-interest. It helps the firm, the young men, the
courts, and the public. A. H. Dudnik and Craig Spangenberg,
two other leading Cleveland lawyers, use similar training pro-
grams in their respective offices.
There is nothing wrong with sheer bigness, within reason-
not according to the American philosophy. But there is an obliga-
tion that accompanies success-the obligation to make sure that
power serves the community and does not harm it.
The Charge: "Clogging The Courts"
This surely is one of the major criticisms of tort lawyers. The
clogged, slow state of our superannuated court system almost
always is blamed on the huge volume of tort actions. With over
70% of all cases in the courts being tort actions, the criticism
seems to be valid-especially when we know that only 5% of
cases in English courts are tort cases.
In part this serious criticism is justified, but only in part.
There are other reasons for the clogged condition of our courts,
none of them the fault of the negligence lawyers. With over 61
million motor vehicles in the United States today, is it any won-
der that automobile accidents have multiplied? That is only one
illustration of the tremendous mechanization of our society. Yet,
industrialization and mechanization are not the major causes of
the flood of personal injury cases, according to some recent
surveys.
Some Bar Associations and some judges point accusingly at
the tort lawyers, as court calendars fall years behind. Nobody
accuses the Bar Associations or the judiciary of serious fault in
this connection, though. Nobody points to the endless, dreary
committee meetings that wind up with a cozy dinner and cock-
tails-and nothing accomplished. Nobody points to the judge
who thinks of his job mainly as a decoration bestowed by an
admiring community-and only secondarily as a grueling task
of work.
Few people stop to think that population growth has far out-
stripped the old-fashioned court systems of most states. Few
communities have enough judges or a truly modem system of
courts and procedure. Patchwork is the rule.
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While they flounder about in search of a solution, the com-
mittees and critics glare at the plaintiffs' lawyers and the calen-
dars. They have tried various experiments, with various degrees
of futility. The obvious answers-more judges and more courts,
for a more complex and crowded era-are not easy or cheap
enough solutions; not while we tax ourselves cruelly in order to
build necessary defense forces, or to give billions away for build-
ing swimming pools for Arabian sheiks or tennis courts for motley
maharajahs.
Senior Associate Judge Charles S. Desmond, of the New
York Court of Appeals, urged use of attorneys as temporary
judges, as one solution.6 That idea has worked successfully in
Massachusetts since 1938. A thunderous silence greeted his sug-
gestion.
New York Supreme Court Justice Samuel H. Hofstadter
proposed a "Lay Court" system, using lay experts-one jurist,
one layman, and one physician.7 This was offered as an alterna-
tive to the Columbia Plan, that would replace our court system
with a Compensation System. The busy !ecturer-judges, like
Botein, Hofstadter and others, have proposed everything from
abolition of juries to abolition of courts-in vain. All these plans
seem to be suggestive of burning down the house in order to
roast the pig. Oddly, the compensation system almost always
seems to be urged only by representatives of big defendants.
Use of impartial medical panels is urged. In New York City
a 50% cut in calendar congestion, through use of pre-trial, was
so accomplished, it is reported.8 Then others say that such panels
serve only to produce three conflicting medical opinions instead
of two, and more delay 9
Nobody complains of some defense lawyers, on a per diem
fee basis, deliberately prolonging clear settlement cases in order
to build up their fees.
New York's experiment with summer trials in 1956 achieved
a one percent reduction in calendar congestion-hardly worth
6 Temporary Court Proposed, CVI N. Y. Times, p. 33 (Nov. 15, 1956); 2
N. C. S. 51 (1956-7).
7 Hofstadter, Alternative Proposal To The Compensation Plan, 42 Cornell
L. Q. 59 (1956).
8 Impartial Medical Testimony (Assn. of the Bar of the City of N. Y., Jan.
23, 1956). $3.95/copy; and see, CV N. Y. Times, p. 33 (Jan. 24, 1956); 1
N. C. S. 91 (1956).
9 Delman, Disapproval of Suggestion for a Medical Panel, 135 N. Y. L. J.
(28) 4 (Feb. 9, 1956).
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the perspiration involved. 10 One New York City Court judge
found 97 cases not ready for trial, of 100 cases called. 1 In 1957
the time for filing for summer trials had to be extended, so poor
was the response. Nobody seemed to like that idea, and New
York's calendars continued to be the longest in the Nation. 12
A permanent federal committee to study the problem was
set up by the United States Attorney General's Conference on
Court Congestion and Delay, in July of 1956.13 Permanent com-
mittees added to temporary committees, for a permanent study?
We could go on and on. The problem continues, and the
scowls at the tort lawyers continue. One result is the cutting of
calendars by backing the cases into the lawyers' own offices by
drastic measures. "Meat axe" methods have been used in the
New York area, producing nice calendar reduction figures; but
what results they produce on clients nobody knows.
Perhaps New York has found something valuable in its new
"No-Pleadings" 14 and "Statement of Readiness" procedure. 5 At
the end of April, 1957 a sharp reduction in calendar congestion
had been achieved, credited primarily to these new procedures.
In May of 1957, Will Shafroth, Chief of the Division of Pro-
cedural Studies and Statistics, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, reported a cut from 5630 (1955) to 1800 (1956)
cases on the federal calendar in the Federal District Court,
Southern District of New York, under the new rules eliminating
automatic calendaring. No case is calendared now, until it is
ready for trial. Trial lawyers may dislike this system; but it
seems to be spreading.
The whole picture and all the main suggestions were sum-
marized in a Report of the New York State Temporary Commis-
sion on the Courts, in February of 1957.10 The recommendations
were as follows:
10 Knowles, Summer Courts, CV N. Y. Times, p. 1 (Aug. 13, 1956); 2 N. C. S.
3 (1956-7). Same disinterest in 1957. Time To File For Summer Jury Trials
Extended, 137 N. Y. L. J. (72) 1 (Apr. 15, 1957).
11 Ibid.
12 Calendar Longest in State Courts Throughout the Nation, 136 N. Y. L. J.
(42) 4 (Aug. 29, 1956).
13 Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied, 136 N. Y. L. J. (3) 4 (July 5, 1956).
14 Official Ed., L. Rpts. & Sess. L., State of N. Y. (A. D.), (Nov. 21, 1956);
and N. Y. Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 118.
15 Reduction of Calendar Delay, 137 N. Y. L. J. (81) 4 (Apr. 26, 1957). And
as to the federal practice, Corres., 137 N. Y. L. J. (86) 4 (May 3, 1957).
I6 N. Y. St. Temp. Comm. on Cts., 137 N. Y. L. J. (27) 4 (Feb. 7, 1957); 2
N. C. S. 98 (1957); and see, Conway, Congested Calendars-And Why, 6
Buffalo L. R. 1 (1956); Note, Methods to Combat Court Congestion and
Delay Recommended, 40 J. Amer. Jud. Soc. 108 (1957).
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1. More judges.
2. Use of pre-trial "Attorney-Masters."
3. Early pre-trial.
4. Comparative negligence rules.
5. Uniform fees and costs.
6. Restriction of hospital liens.
7. More lawyers handling negligence cases.
The Commission expressly rejected:
a. Administrative, compensation-type boards.
b. Restriction of jury trials.
c. Trial referees or auditors.
d. Interest on negligence claims.
Without laboring the point, it seems clear that most of the
scowling at tort lawyers, as somehow responsible for calendar
congestion, is quite unreasonable. They are no more responsible
for it than are lawyers generally. If anything, they have fought
sturdily to prevent a reckless destruction of the jury system and
other hard-won protections of liberty. They, more than other
lawyers, want the court congestion to be cleared. That con-
gestion aids the defense far more than it benefits the plaintiff-
and it rarely benefits the plaintiff. On the contrary, as all will
agree-justice delayed is justice denied.
The Charge: "Abuse of the Jury System"
While it is not clear just how tort lawyers "abuse" the jury
system, this charge is often hurled at them. Presumably the
"abuse" consists of preferring jury trials to non-jury trials. Some
judges have muttered angrily at this preference, which seems to
impugn at least the kindliness of judges. Everyone knows that
juries are often more generous in making awards than are judges
alone.
Actually the root of the charge is that lawyers often, above
all, primarily seek to get a serious injury case to the jury, in the
hope that vivid injuries will outweigh less concrete liability
premises. Morally, such a practice is quite questionable. The
question of damages should not arise in a case unless and until
the liability is established.
Defense lawyers are particularly bitter on this point, and
justly so. It is infuriating to have a plaintiff's lawyer say: "Let's
not discuss liability, because my client is injured and that's
enough for me. My client was hurt, wasn't he!" 17
17 Weston, Appeasement of Tort Claimants, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 58 (1957).
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For many plaintiffs' lawyers, the drafting of a petition aims
at only one major target-to make some kind of issue of fact;
just enough to make sure that the pleading is not dismissed on
the law, and gets to the jury. They are sure that, once the case
gets to the jury, the odds are with them, no matter how tenuous
the theory of liability may be. They aim for sympathy appeal-
bathos-rather than sound law and justice.
Human as this purpose may be, it is fundamentally immoral,
and destructive of the real purpose of law-objective justice.
Insofar as plaintiff's lawyers are guilty of this tactical tech-
nique as a regular practice, they are abusing the jury system.
Ultimately they will cause enactment of such strict technical rules
of pleading that they will curse their own folly. Meanwhile, they
cast over their profession a pall of artificial, immoral sentimen-
tality and false jury-appeal. It is an insidious, poisonously im-
moral approach, all the more deadly because it is so enticing and
profitable. But it may lead to a revulsion that will penalize many
legally valid claims.' 8
One kind of obvious reaction is the proposal to do away with
juries entirely in negligence cases. Such prominent lecturer-
judges as Chief Justice Peck of New York's Appellate Division,
First Department, have made this suggestion. Fortunately, such
men as Chief Justice Conway and Associate Justice Van Voorhis
of New York's Court of Appeals opposed the suggestion, as did
NACCA and many others. 19 For the time being this destructive
proposal now seems to have been defeated. But it indicates the
intensity of reaction that abuse of the jury system can inspire.
To a large extent this is a problem in personal ethics and
morality. Its cure must be based on this fundamental character-
istic. What can be done about it right now, I will not venture
to guess.
The Charge: "Harassment of Medical Men"
Bitter differences between the medical and the legal pro-
fessions have had profoundly harmful effects. Such seemingly
theoretical differences as that over the meaning of causation
18 For an example of general lambasting of this and other charges, see,
Botein, Who Are The Accident Victims-The Parties, The Public or The
Courts, 12 The Record, 185 (Assn. of the Bar of the City of N. Y., Apr. 1957).
19 Note, 2 Plaintiff's Advocate (2) 1-16 (N. Y. St. Assn. Pl. Tr. Lawyers,
Feb. 1956); 1 N. C. S. (13) 104 (Apr. 1, 1956).
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have produced angry disputes between physicians and lawyers.20
It is quite clear that many doctors fear courts and lawyers.21 And
what one fears one usually dislikes. The sorry state of relations
between the professions is causing growing concern to both.2 2
Harm resulting from the enmity of so influential a profession
as medicine hardly can be afforded by the legal profession. The
results of enmity of even a few doctors can be very serious. The
pity of it is that such enmity usually grows out of misunderstand-
ing. It is long past time that both professions took action to un-
derstand each other, and to cooperate for the public welfare.
Some few lawyers, such as Albert Averbach of New York
and Samuel Gerber (M. D., LL. B.) of Cleveland, have done fine
work in improving the relations between the professions. 23 At
Cleveland-Marshall Law School we have had most gratifying re-
sults in our invitations to national medical leaders to join as
Medical Advisory Editors on the law review organization. The
Cleveland-Marshall Law Review now has a masthead showing
the names of fourteen nationally famous doctors who are its
Medical-Advisory Editors. The doctors have welcomed the
chance to cooperate. The lawyers must do no less. Law-medicine
centers, institutes, and publications must be supported and en-
larged. They are very helpful.24 Medicolegal codes of conduct,
such as that adopted in New York this summer, are invaluable.
Malpractice suits, of course, are a major source of inter-pro-
fession bitterness. Doctors often view them as assaults by law-
yers. Lawyers rail at doctors for refusing to testify against each
other. Bitterness compounds bitterness.
The doctors are very understandably upset about the tide of
malpractice suits. Lawyers surely would feel the same way if
they were the targets. There has been a tenfold increase in
20 Averbach, Causation: A Medico-Legal Battlefield, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 209
(May, 1957).
21 Sindell, The Frightened Medical Witness, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 75 (Jan.
1957). The resentful fear is apparent in an odd physician's publication book
review: Iatros, Meet "The King of Torts," 3 Med. News (9) 5 (May 6, 1957).
22 Kamman & Raudenbush, Medicolegal Relations, 38 Minn. M. (4) 228
(1955); Gilligan. Medico-Legal Problems-The Physicians' and Lawyers'
Viewpoints, Medicolegal Symposiums, 64 (Law Dept., A. M. A., Chicago 10,
Ill., 1955); 2 N. C. S. 30 (1956-7).
23 Averbach, supra, n. 20; and see, Averbach, Aids For Improvement of
Doctor-Lawyer Relationship, in Case and Comment (Nov.-Dec. 1956); di-
gested from Insur. L. J. (Apr. 1956).
24 See, Schroeder, The Law-Medicine Center: Four Years Experience, 28
Cleveland B. A. J. 19 (Dec., 1956); A. M. A. Head .... 3 Med. News (14) 4
(July 29, 1957).
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medical malpractice suits in the last 25 years. Yet, malpractice
was proved in only 5 percent of the cases. Meanwhile damage
awards increased by 149 percent; and malpractice insurance
premiums went up 850 percent in one year in one state, just for
example. 25 By 1955 only six insurance companies were writing
malpractice policies, where there used to be 100 companies doing
so.
26 The anger of the doctors has been correspondingly increas-
ing.27
In 1945 there was one malpractice suit per 71 physicians. In
1955 there was one suit per 25 physicians. 28 Medical malpractice
insurance rates reached astronomical proportions in 1957.29 No
wonder the doctors are angry. Nor are they soothed when other
doctors tell them that 60 percent of the cases stem from loose
talk to patients by the doctors themselves.30 And they seldom
will admit that their own ignorance may be a cause, though it is
recognized as a major cause by such medical authorities as Dr.
Walter C. Alvarez.31
Doctors will not acknowledge that their own propaganda has
boomeranged here. The A. M. A. and Hollywood have so glorified
the "Men in White" that patients expect miracles from every
M. D. Then the patient is furious when he finds that the "in-
fallible physician" is only a human who can make mistakes. But
surely a lawyer should not leap at every chance to crucify a
physician for making a mistake.
The doctors wanted a "doctors' court for doctors," as a solu-
tion. They got one in Washington State, under the first Medical
Disciplinary Act, adopted there in October of 1955.32 Its results
have been interesting-only two tax evasion suspensions in the
25 Iatros, Malpractice-Its Prevention and Cure, 2 Med. News (2) 5 (1956).
26 latros, Danger, Lawsuit Ahead, 2 Med. News (10) 7 (1956).
27 See, Regan, Note, Med. Econ. 203 (1955); Regan, Note, Readers' Digest
(Jan. 1955); Regan, Malpractice and the Physician, 54 Wis. M. J. (1) 18
(1955); Regan, Legal Aspects of Obstetrical Practice, Modem Med. 182
(Aug. 1955). And see n. 28.
28 Gilligan, Medico-Legal Problems-The Physicians' and Lawyers' View-
points, Proceedings in Medicolegal Symposiums, 64 (Law Dept., A. M. A.,
Chicago, Ill., 1955).
29 latros, Malpractice Insurance Crisis, 3 Med. News (7) 5 (1957). And see,
Morris, Medical Malpractice-A Changing Picture, 23 Ins. Counsel J. 23
(1956).
30 Gilligan, supra, n. 28.
31 Alvarez, Refusal To Admit Ignorance, in Medical Roundup, Cleveland
Plain Dealer, 42 (Dec. 14, 1956).
32 Note, 1 Med. News (4) 1 (Oct. 24, 1955).
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first full year of operation of the "doctors' court" in Washington
State.33 A remarkably well behaved profession, when the doctors
are their own judges! Very different from the harsh judgments
of Bar Association Grievance Committees!
Physicians' fees for serving as expert witnesses are another
source of trouble. Justice Isidore Wasservogel of New York City
excoriated the .doctors on this point. Perhaps he was right, but
how often do the doctors try to criticize legal fees? A 1955 med-
icolegal conference in New York City said the medical experts'
fees were too high. It recommended the schedule followed in
Richmond County, New York: $10 fee for pre-trial; $50 in lower
courts up to $2000 damages; $100 in intermediate courts up to
$6000 damages; and $150 in superior courts with over $6000
damages.84 Would it not be wiser to fix fees by agreement be-
tween professions than by one-sided pressure?
Impartial panels of medical experts, so enthusiastically
favored by doctors, are strongly opposed by many lawyers-
another source of friction. The indefatigable lecturer-judge
Botein of New York, says they have been a great success.3 5 Pre-
siding Justice David W. Peck, of New York's Appellate Division,
favors them too.3 6 They have been tried, with success, in Mary-
land (Baltimore), Minnesota, New York, and elsewhere.3 7 Such
trial leaders as Melvin M. Belli have spoken favorably of them.
38
The writers of uniform codes favor them.3 9 Yet many lawyers
bitterly oppose them. Is this simply evidence of stubborn con-
servatism? Or do these lawyers thus reveal a fundamental hos-
tility to medical men?
If lawyers will reach out even for chiropractors, in attempts
to use them as general medical experts, as they sometimes do40 ,
33 Iatros, Doctors' Court For Doctors, 2 Med. News (2) 5 (Nov. 5, 1956).
But before smiling, remember that attorneys' malpractice is much harder
for a plaintiff to prove. See, Gardner, Attorneys' Malpractice, 6 Clev.-Mar.
L. R. 264 (1957).
34 Note, 1 Med. News (2) 1 (Sept. 26, 1955).
35 News Item, CV N. Y. Times (Dec. 4, 1955); Botein, Impartial Medical
Testimony, 135 N. Y. L. J. (21) 4 (Jan. 31, 1956).
86 Peck, A Successful New Plan: Impartial Medical Testimony, 42 A. B. A.
J., 931 (Oct. 1956).
37 Anderson, Unbiased Medical Expert Testimony-An Actuality, Proceed-
ings in Medicolegal Symposiums, 102 (Law Dept., A. M. A., Chicago 10, Ill.,
1955); Peck, supra, n. 36; Peck, Impartial Medical Testimony, 136 N. Y. L. J.
(59) 4 (Sept. 24, 1956); Goldstein, Medical Expert Testimony, Proceedings(above stated) p. 51; 2 N. C. S. 19 (1956-7).
88 Belli, Modern Trials, Sec. 59 (1) (1954).
39 Model Expert Test. Act, 9 Unif. L. Anno., Misc. Acts, 429-439.
40 Fries v. Goldsby, 80 N. W. 2d 171 (Nebr., 1957).
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their opposition to impartial medical experts rings a little hol-
lowly. Lawyers need and want the cooperation of doctors, and
must meet the doctors at least half-way, if they expect coopera-
tion.
Certainly the growing hostility between the professions is
both unseemly and dangerous. Moreover, it promises to become
worse unless both sides try to correct the situation. As it stands,
there is some justification in the charge that the legal profession
deliberately gives the doctors a bad time. Even a little justifica-
tion for such a charge is intolerable.
The Charge: "Raising Insurance Rates"
This accusation naturally is most usually voiced by the in-
surance companies and their counsel. 41 It has been answered so
often and discussed so often that it will be merely mentioned
here. 42 The charge itself is so full of self-serving purposes, on
41 See, for example, Pierson, The Defense Attorney and Basic Defense
Tactics, Sec. 4 (1956); Notes, 1 Defense L. J. 6-14 (1957); Weston, Appease-
ment of Tort Claimants, 6 Clev.-Mar. L. R. 58 (1957).
42 See, for example, Belli, Ready For The Plaintiff, 9, 40 (1956). A recent
study series of articles conducted by Reporter Aaron Jacobson for the
Cleveland News reported (in May, 1957) the subjoined interesting insurance
statistics for the Cleveland (Cuyahoga County) Ohio area: (Jacobson is a
law student in my Torts class at Cleveland-Marshall Law School, as well as
a full-time newspaperman assigned to courts and law news and feature
work.) Compare these figures with the Times report of multi-billion in-
surance premium rises, and draw your own conclusions.
"In 1933 ------- insurance companies paid $5,638,000 in personal injury
claims arising from auto accidents in Ohio.
"For the year 1955, the insurers reported paying $39,968,000-an increase
of 700 per cent! (These are the losses reported to the Ohio Department of
Insurance.)
"Cuyahoga County's share of this bundle last year is placed at $8,500,000.
"Add $600,000 paid out by the Cleveland Transit System.
"Add $700,000 from the railroads. Their 1956 payments include another
$700,000 paid out in cases handled by Cleveland lawyers in other Ohio areas.
"Add $1,000,000 paid to claimants through general liability insurance for
injuries other than vehicular.
"The total thus far neighbors on $11,000,000, but the figure is incomplete.
"There are trucking lines which are self-insurers.
"There are those claims paid by individuals or firms not carrying insur-
ance, or which are not fully covered by insurance.
"Experts on the paying end of personal injury work estimate that
$15,000,000--as a conservative figure-were paid to injured claimants or in
death claims during 1956. This is the Cuyahoga County figure.
"Nor does it include the $5,000,000 spent here by insurance companies in
satisfying property damage claims.
- - The Cost of living index for 1932 in the Cleveland area
was 55.8. At the beginning of 1957, it was 120 ------.-....
- Vehicular accidents occurring in the city of Cleveland
rose from 11,401 in 1934 to 36,180 in 1955, or 217 per cent.
" -------------- For 1934, 4,089 suffered injuries, as compared to the
5,584 in 1955 - --- The increase is only 36 per cent.
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both sides, that it requires intensive study and statistics inappro-
priate here. It may suffice just to point out, as did the New York
Times on May 5, 1957, that annual premiums on accident insur-
ance now run over 3 billion dollars a year. Twenty years ago
they were $161 million. Clearly there has been a vast increase-.
in insurance company revenues, as well as in rates.
The Charge: "Exorbitant Fees"
Few charges against plaintiffs' tort lawyers are more often
repeated than this one. Even among lawyers today, negligence
practice often is viewed as the "rich" field of practice. But con-
tingent fees of 50 percent do raise the hackles of most observers
-especially of laymen. A fifty-fifty split has a bad sound for
most people, no matter how hard the lawyer had to work to re-
cover for his client. It simply sounds like too much, if nothing
else. Fundamentally, a lawyer should work for an adequate fee,
of course, but not as a partner of the client. That-partnership
in the claim-is the implication of a fifty-fifty fee arrangement.
There has been a growing current of criticism of the high
percentage of lawyers' contingent fees in negligence. The view
of the courts as to this was clearly stated in the Official Fee Sched-
ules adopted by New York's First Department, effective January
1, 1957.4 3 As amended, 44 that schedule in effect abolished the
50 percent contingent fee, for most purposes.45 It set up a more
(Continued from preceding page)
--------- 
Some 90 per cent of car owners now carryliability insurance ---------------
40 per cent were estimated to have carried similar insurance
in the 1930's.
-- Coverage popularly carried 20 or 25 years ago was
$5,000 for single injury or death, and $10,000 for two or more injured or
killed.
"Today, the popular coverage, according to insurance company repre-
sentatives, is $20,000--$40,000, and $50,000-$100,000. Many persons of aver-
age means have extended their coverages to $100,000-$300,000.
"In addition, commercial and industrial firms commonly carry one-and
-three--million dollar liability coverages on their executives and employes
who drive, and a general liability protection."
43 Special Rules of App. Div., Supr. Ct., State of N. Y., First Jud. Dept.,
Rule 4; see, 136 N. Y. L. J. (62) 1 (Sept. 27, 1956). 50% on first $1000; 40%
on next $2000; 35% on next $22,000; 20% (changed to 25%) on next $25,000;
etc.
44 App. Div., First Dept., N. Y., Amendment of Rules Regulating Contingent
Fees, 136 N. Y. L. J. 1 (Dec. 27, 1956). Adding an alternative sliding scale,
and removing the charging of expenses against the lawyer's fee.
45 New York Court Adopts Contingent Fee Schedule, 40 J. Amer. Jud. Soc.,
86 (Oct.-Dec., 1956).
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modest schedule, more compatible with public opinion. An im-
mediate attempt by a group of lawyers to overturn the new court
rule was defeated on technical grounds." And the newspapers'
reports of that defeat contained more than a hint of gleeful satis-
faction with the discomfiture of the lawyers. But on June 14th, a
single justice (Stevens) overturned the rules, as unconstitutional,
on the applications of Harry Gair and Emile Zola Berman. Litiga-
tion to the Court of Appeals surely will follow. This looks like a
Pyrrhic victory.47
It is a sad commentary on plaintiffs' lawyers that it took
court-rules action to attempt to cut negligence case contingent
fees down to more reasonable levels. They should be glad that
even more drastic action was not employed.
Quantum meruit always is the best general measure of what
a lawyers' fee should be.48 Certainly it is not sound to work on
a "what the traffic will bear" basis.
The Charge: "Use of Circus Methods"
Demonstrative evidence is what is meant by "circus meth-
ods," ordinarily. This charge has the flavor of sour grapes, in
most cases. It is a charge made almost entirely by defeated de-
fense lawyers. In any event, we can safely leave to the judges
the control of attorneys who overstep the bounds of good taste
and proper trial practices. 49 It is not improper for an advocate
to be an advocate. Yet, use of gruesome sideshow devices to in-
flame juries of course cannot be tolerated, and is condemned by
the courts. 50
Some few attorneys are natural born "hams" who so love
the spotlight and sensationalism that they sometimes do go too
far. But to sweepingly accuse all plaintiffs' tort lawyers of this
46 Lawyers Lose Fee Bid, N. Y. Times, p. 45 (Jan. 31, 1957).
47 Ibid.; and Jurist Overrides Appellate Court, N. Y. Times, p. 19 (June 15,
1957). For a detailed discussion of court views of the subject see Wojcik v.
Miller Bakeries Corp., 2 N. Y. 2d 631 (1957), rev'g 2 A. D. 2d 705.
48 Inman v. Gonzales, 80 S. 2d 914 (La. App., 1956). Breach of contract
damages, for improper dismissal, Berry v. Nichols, 298 S. W, 2d 40 (Ark.,
1957).
49 See, for example (exhibition of body bums): Magnolia Petroleum Co. v.
Angelly, 306 P. 2d 309 (Okla., 1957); Belli, Modern Trials (1954).
50 Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 191 F. 2d 302 (C. A. 7, 1951); Hall v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 349 Ill. App. 175, 110 N. E. 2d 654 (1953).
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is simply wrong. The. gentle art of judge or opponent baiting
belongs to no one group of lawyers.
5
'
Defense lawyers, of course, long have said that "circus meth-
ods" are what have led to much of the success of plaintiffs' law-
yers in recent years. They complain bitterly that NACCA's cam-
paign for "more adequate" awards actually has resulted in ex-
cessive and oppressive verdicts.52
That plaintiffs' tort lawyers should be thus generally accused
of legal bad manners is itself disturbing. It does perhaps indicate
a lack of wise personal public relations in some cases.
The duty of personal injury lawyers, like any other lawyers,
to follow a high standard of personal dignity, always offers a
hard problem. Just for example, take the problem of publicity.
It is understandable that legitimate publicity often should be
desired. But the interests of the entire profession and of the
public always are superior to the personal interests and ambitions
of any attorney. For all lawyers the regulatory rules of the Bar
Associations must be uniformly enforced, with justice, but also
with firmness. Publicity seeking may be understandable, but it is
fraught with explosive possibilities for discredit to the profession.
It is simply not safe to allow it to be governed only by the private
conscience of each individual. New York State Bar Association
Canon 20, for example, bars press releases or statements about
pending cases, in quite sweeping terms.
Yet, attention to good professional public relations is a
private as well as a profession-wide duty. For example, in writ-
ing an article for a professional journal or other publication,
elementary decency requires that good taste always shall be
used. Otherwise the whole profession may be to some extent
demeaned by the bad taste of one man. It is just as easy, for
example, to say that your opponent is "wrong" as to say that he
is "stupid." It is more gentlemanly to say that a defense lawyer
is "seeking favorable evidence" than that he is "wolfishly sniffing
for angles"; that he "smiles" rather than that he "leers." Even a
sharp attack on an opponent's theories never should degenerate
51 See, Botein, The Gentle Art of Judge-Baiting, 137 N. Y. L. J. (26) 4
(Feb. 6, 1957).
52 See, Pierson, The Defense Attorney and Basic Defense Tactics, 5 (1956);
Pierson, 1 Defense L. J. 276 (1957); Hobson, NACCA-As Viewed by De-
fense Counsel, 20 Ky. S. B. J. 170 (1956); But, see, Belli, Ready For The
Plaintiff, 7 (1956); Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 Calif. L. R. 1 (1951);
and, Lambert, NACCA-Rumor and Reflection (reprinted from Harv. Law
Record) in, 18 NACCA L. J. 25 (Nov. 1956).
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into an attack on him personally. Ironically, too, the ultimate
effect of such tactics usually is that the discourtesy boomerangs.
Noblesse oblige is a motto that particularly should be fol-
lowed by the most successful lawyers, but its principle applies
equally to any member of any distinguished group. And surely
we all want the members of the legal profession to continue to
be such a group.
Use of dramatic, powerfully persuasive methods is not, per
se, wrong. Its effectiveness has been made very clear by such
men as Belli. Drama, however, should not be confused with sen-
sationalism; and sensationalism is not a valid substitute for
drama.
The Catch-AU Charge: "Destroying the Ethics
of the Bar and of the Nation"
All of the charges mentioned above, and some others, some-
times are lumped together in one catch-all charge. The article
in Harper's, mentioned at the beginning of this discussion, was
of that kind. It darkly warned of destruction of national morality
by personal injury lawyers. Nor did its vagueness and errors
take the harm out of it, as far as public opinion is concerned.
A general charge invites a general answer. All in all, the
charge is not valid. But, as we have seen, it unhappily does have
some elements of validity in it.
That partial confession and avoidance is enough to shame the
profession. The answer should be able to be a flat, categorical
denial. Until the answer of the Tort Bar to such charges is a
complete rebuttal of any and all such charges, that answer is
insuffcient.
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